

European Briefing

The European Employment Strategy: existing research and remaining questions

Caroline de la Porte, *European University Institute, Florence, Italy*

Philippe Pochet*, *Observatoire social européen, Brussels, Belgium*

Introduction

The European Employment Strategy (EES) has sparked lively debates in political and academic circles. These have been particularly pronounced since the EES was identified as the flagship for the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). The aim of this article is to review the blossoming academic literature on the EES. We begin by reviewing the strategy itself, before assessing three broader debates that have emerged in the literature on the EES: policy learning, democracy and the European social model. In conclusion, we point to the eminently political nature of the strategy, reflected in the absence of political consensus on an independent status for the OMC in the future constitution.

The European Employment Strategy

In the literature on the EES and the OMC, the dominant analytical approach is explicitly or implicitly situated in the multi-level governance literature. The starting point of this perspective is that the world (and the European Union) is increasingly complex (Kooiman, 1993), and that traditional top-down regulatory mechanisms are insufficient to adequately deal with this complexity. What is required are 'new modes of governance' able to respond to the challenges created by increased complexity. The OMC is frequently characterized as a 'new mode of governance' in a multi-level European Union which exhibits overlapping competencies assigned to multiple levels of

government, and interactions of political actors which cross those levels (Marks et al., 1996). New modes of governance can be referred to as 'the range of innovation and transformation that has been and continues to occur in the instruments, methods, modes and systems of governance in contemporary polities and economies, and especially within the European Union (EU) and its member states (both current and prospective)'. In contrast with 'traditional' modes of governance, they are 'only marginally – if at all – based on legislation and/or rely on the self-regulation of private actors, the co-regulation of private and public actors as well as the delegation of tasks to new public actors (regulatory agencies) in policy formulation'.¹ The distinctiveness of this analytical approach is its focus on the meso and micro levels of policy making.

There are numerous accounts of how the EES – as the precursor of the OMC – functions as a process (de la Porte and Pochet, 2002; Goetschy, 1999; Jacobsson, 2001a; 2001b; Szyszczak, 2000a; 2000b; Trubek and Mosher, 2001). Some were written prior to the coining of the OMC concept. In these accounts, the process is described as being based on guidelines that provide a margin for adaptation at national level, but which also involve processes of benchmarking, multi-lateral surveillance and peer review. Member states are encouraged to transpose specific policy objectives in the Employment Guidelines to national-level programmes in ways which accord with their particular socio-economic circumstances. To illustrate their efforts, member states submit a National

* Author to whom correspondence should be sent: Philippe Pochet, Observatoire social européen, rue Paul-Emile Janson, 13, B-1050 Brussels, Belgium. [email: pochet@ose.be]

Action Plan (NAP). The Commission and the Labour and Social Affairs Council in turn synthesize the national reports and make an annual assessment of the progress of individual member states and the Union as a whole. Since 1999, the Commission has issued individual recommendations, to be endorsed by the Council, to the member states for corrective action.² In this light, the Labour and Social Affairs Council adapts the guidelines and decides on new initiatives at Community level. This process is repeated on an annual basis (Adnett, 2001; de la Porte et al., 2001).

These accounts of the EES also provide details of the institutional set-up, where the Employment Committee, which advises the Labour and Social Affairs Council, and the Commission are key players. These studies most often point to the continuous shift in the balance of power between the member states, in an intergovernmental logic, and the Commission, in a supranational logic. However, these approaches are not used as fully-fledged explanatory frameworks. They focus on the macro level, and are above all useful to explain 'history-making moments such as treaty revisions or major crises' (Rosamond, 2000: 106).

Some accounts suggest that although the Council has the final veto point, the Commission plays a key role as a norm entrepreneur. As a norm entrepreneur, it would not only have the capacity to set the agenda, but also the capacity to influence the preferences of member states throughout the policy process (Schmidt, 2000). Through its role as the secretariat in the Employment Committee, it is an important actor in setting the agenda of the Committee's meetings. It has been argued that it has significant capacity to orient debates, to propose indicators and benchmarks, to advance new ideas, and to pressure member states to comply with the guidelines, benchmarks and recommendations it issues to individual member states (de la Porte and Pochet, 2003). It could thus be conceived as an important norm entrepreneur in the implementation of the OMC (de la Porte, 2002; de la Porte et al., 2001; Goetschy, 1999). However, there have been no empirical tests on

the extent of the Commission's influence as a norm entrepreneur.

Aside from the dominant focus on process in a multi-level governance logic, analyses of specific aspects of the EES are sparse and mostly exploratory. It is worth examining these aspects in more detail, as it is arguably these which differentiate the EES and the OMC from pure intergovernmental bargaining. These specificities include the indicators and benchmarks that have increased in number and in political status throughout the lifetime of the strategy. The official peer review session on best practices that accompanies each round of reporting has also not been analysed in detail. It is a two-day process, whereby member states present their NAPs and respond to prepared critiques made by other member states. The peer review programme on active labour market policies, which is of a more voluntary nature than the peer review of the whole NAP, is also under-analysed. Peer review in this context is supposed to involve national experts seeking to respond to a specific and targeted problem that has successfully been combated elsewhere through a particular initiative (Bisopoulos, forthcoming). However, a first assessment of the peer review programme has concluded that the possibilities for policy or initiative transfer are limited, due to significant structural and practical differences between member states. Such reviews have – at best – sparked national-level discussions on certain aspects of active labour market policies (<http://peerreview.almp.org/pdf/evaluation-report-10-01.pdf>). In addition, the relationship between the EES and the European Social Fund – which, although theoretically linked, in practice follow separate dynamics (Hartwig, 2002) – has yet to be the subject of detailed analysis. Finally, one EES tool, which as it is discussed in the literature might be expected to lead to policy change, is that of public 'naming and shaming'. However, while this may take place within the process itself, Meyer (2003) has recently demonstrated that media coverage of the EES has decreased since

1997. There are thus notable gaps in the literature regarding particular dimensions of the EES and how they might be integrated more fully into existing analyses.

Learning, democracy, participation, and the European Social Model

The bulk of the literature on the EES (and OMC) is linked to broader questions associated with the governance of the EU. This section reviews three of the most important of these questions: policy learning, democracy, and the European social model.

Learning

For political scientists and sociologists, many of whom analyse the EES from a multi-level governance perspective, the strategy and the OMC operate theoretically in a completely different way than top-down governance – in a more cooperative and participative spirit and with the use of different tools that should lead to policy change through learning. Thus it is argued that the learning process engendered by one or several OMC instruments could lead to changes adapted to national contexts (Biagi, 2000: 159; de Búrca and Zeitlin, 2003: 2; de la Porte and Pochet, 2002; Eberlein and Kerwer, 2002: 3; Ferrera et al., 2000; 2002; Hemerijck, 2001; Jacobsson, 2001b: 1; Knill and Lenschow, 2003; Overdevest, 2002; Scharpf, 2002; Trubek and Mosher, 2003). This focus on learning reflects the fact that the interest in the OMC has above all been driven by the ideational dimension, i.e. the possibility that it could lead to changes in ideas and discourse among national actors. These are mainly derived from a sociological institutionalist approach and focus on the cognitive effect of the EES (Goetschy, 2003; Jacobsson, 2001a; 2001b; Trubek and Mosher, 2001). ‘Effects may include ... more subtle impact on national debates and discourses, changes in ways of

thinking policy (policy principles), and collective understandings and identities’ (Jacobsson, 2001a: 3).

Trubek and Mosher (2003) have analysed the EES according to its ‘learning capabilities’ – i.e. the features and instruments – which, they maintain, embody ‘mechanisms for learning’. They drew up a list of such mechanisms from the literature of organizational learning and deliberative democracy. These are:

... mechanisms that destabilize existing understandings, bring together people with diverse viewpoints in settings that require sustained deliberation about problem-solving; facilitate erosion of boundaries between both policy domains and stakeholders; reconfigure policy networks; encourage decentralized experimentation; produce information on innovation; require sharing of good practice and experimental results; encourage actors to compare their results with those of the best performers in any area; and oblige actors collectively to redefine objectives and policies. (Trubek and Mosher, 2003: 46–7)

They judge that the EES contains all these elements, in one degree or another. They identify the EES’s overall objectives, re-enforced through quantitative benchmarks, as the most powerful learning instrument, because definition and measurement of objectives could destabilize prior understandings of issues and thus lead to incremental changes (Trubek and Mosher, 2003). This has also been suggested elsewhere (de la Porte and Pochet, 2002; de la Porte et al., 2001), but it has been recognized that thus far the learning capabilities of the EES have been weak in many instances.

Learning can at the same time be conceived as a functional feature of the EES, as well as an important dimension of its output. When the EES was first launched, it was decided that it should be evaluated after a five-year period. This evaluation process does not support the thesis of an important learning dimension, and little evidence of learning processes can be found in the national evaluations.³ In fact, the

adoption of the new strategy was driven by political bargaining rather than by learning from the weaknesses and successes of the last five years.

Democracy

Theories of deliberative democracy have been influential in recent debates on governance and democracy in the EU. Two approaches in particular have been associated with specific EU processes. The first approach is that of deliberative supranationalism, where political deliberation is designed to foster mutual learning among experts; here the focus has primarily been on the role of comitology committees (Joerges, 1999; Joerges and Neyer, 1997). Yet there is considerable scepticism concerning this form of deliberation. For example, Dehousse (forthcoming) argues that 'in the eyes of public opinion, cooperation between experts within more or less obscure networks is not necessarily the best form of legitimation ... Space for debate and mechanisms of control are thus necessary'. Second, the EES (and the OMC) – especially in terms of participation, transparency and openness – are also being analysed through the theory of directly deliberative polyarchy that stresses the importance of the participation of different citizens in a bottom-up logic (Cohen and Sabel, 2003). The ambition of the latter theoretical perspective is normative, and the importance of the participative dimension of the EES is arguably overstated, yet does have an important place in the EES.

In the framework of the EES, the social partners in the national arena are encouraged to participate in all stages of the process and are in particular called upon to take an active role in the adaptability pillar. Participation is also emphasized in the framework of the OMC (Telò, 2002). Current research indicates that in practice, participation in the EES has proved to be uneven, especially among trade unions (Raveaud, 2001 for the French case; Winterton and Foden, 2002). The European Foundation

for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions conducted a cross-national survey on the participation of social partners. Without presenting an exhaustive account of the results, several observations are worth mentioning. First, in all countries but one (Luxembourg), the national action plans are characterized as governmental, rather than jointly-produced documents. This point is worth emphasizing, as theoretical accounts of the OMC characterize its dynamic as bottom-up. In seven out of fifteen countries, the social partners have, however, made a direct contribution to the national action plan. Such contributions were mainly to the adaptability pillar, where the responsibility of the social partners is strongest. A high level of satisfaction of the participatory conditions is correlated with a direct contribution to the NAP in six out of the seven cases, the exception being Denmark. It therefore seems that the level of satisfaction of the social partners increases with the quality – more active – of their participation.

Participation of local actors in the EES process is another emerging area of research (Jacobsson, forthcoming; Schmid, 2002; Zeitlin, 2002). Recent empirical findings for Sweden suggest that local policy making for matters covered by the EES takes place independently from the EES. In Sweden, 'local action plans' (LAPs) are drawn up on the basis of the political objectives agreed under the EES by actors at local level (financed by the Commission, the actor pushing hardest for increasing participation; Pochet, 2003). However, the LAPs are to a great extent developed independently of the NAPs. As put by Jacobsson (forthcoming):

The EES has so far in much developed as a superficial and centralised process *in parallel* to the existing structures, instead of linking up systematically with these locally and regionally.

Recent analyses suggest that there is a move towards greater involvement in the EES, but that this differs according to country and to

the type of non-state actor. Schelkle (forthcoming: 12) suggest that government officials are not always keen on involving more actors: 'If OMC is predominantly concerned with domestic reforms in a situation of deep uncertainty, participation of non-state actors – and thus a stronger EU leverage – is sometimes but not always appreciated by the government'.

European Social Model

The theme of the European Social Model must be considered in conjunction with the consequences of EMU, which shaped both the objectives and institutional design of the EES. Rather than being seen as a classical spill-over, however, the EES should be viewed, in Dyson's words, in terms of 'pollination, [for] whether the seeds of integration germinate successfully in proximate sectors, like labour markets and budgetary policy, depends on the fertility of the soil there; in integration, fertility requires a critical mass of actors with the will and the capacity to act' (1994: 295). This approach makes explicit the importance of the politics of the process. In this respect, the work of van Riel and van der Meer (2002), explaining the emergence of the EES through advocacy coalitions, is interesting. It suggests that the role of certain ideas is supported by specific groups of actors in the definition of the EES's policy content at European level, as well as the implementation of its different components in member states.

There are some analyses that seek to establish the precise nature of the link between EMU and EES (de la Porte and Pochet, 2003; Hodson and Maher, 2001; Jenson and Pochet, forthcoming; Wessels and Linsenmann, 2001). Indeed, the EES is linked to the overarching objective of the European Union to increase its competitiveness and economic performance. The EEG is subordinated to the objectives of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG) that define the general economic policy of the Union. In this respect, Begg (2003: 6) points out that the EES has not sought to make a

'broader contribution ... to steering the economy'. Indeed, the more fundamental parts of labour market reform, such as wage and regulatory flexibility, are not part of the strategy, and receive more attention in the BEPG.

Begg (2003) has argued that the EES is characterized by Third Way type ideas, including equity (see Rubery, 2002) and activation. The form and effect of activation policies has been discussed particularly in welfare state literature but also by political actors. While some criticize the notion of activation, others act as spokespersons/advocates of welfare state reform (Ferrera et al., 2000; Hemerijck, 2001; Scharpf, 2002). From a reform perspective, the EES can be seen as an additional instrument with which to enhance the social dimension to the European Union (Ferrera, 2001; Pochet, 2002; Rodrigues, 2002). Others, however, remain sceptical of its real added value to compensate the European Social Model for the liberal bias of EU integration (Scharpf, 2002).

Among the issues debated regarding the European Social Model is activation's actual impact on the employment rate of the European Union and on member states' employment policies more generally (Barbier, 2001). While the employment rate of the Union has increased since the launching of the strategy, this is attributable to many factors. It is virtually impossible to single out the influence of the EES per se. What can be affirmed is that most of the pressure to converge towards the EU's objectives under the EES – of which activation is an important component – is on countries with Continental and Southern European welfare state arrangements, with male-breadwinner, female carer model and differentiation of social protection according to occupational class, and dominance of passive policies (de la Porte, 2002). However, besides the general move from passive to active policies that the EES implies, there are few specific thematic analyses of the EES (on entrepreneurship, see Foden and Magnusson, 2000). Nonetheless, it appears from the five-year evaluation of the EES, confirmed by Rubery (2002: 550), that '... in the recent

period by far the most important EU influence on equal opportunities policies has come from the employment strategy’.

The EES, where agreement on strategic objectives and benchmarks is above all decided by consensus, has recently been raised in political status. It is now synchronized in terms of timing with the more politically salient (at least at European level) Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG). Yet from a normative perspective, the implications of having a social policy built around employment need to be explored. Some headway has been made in this direction (Visser, 2002). Indeed, some of the most interesting national studies of the +5 EES assessment adopt this approach (http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2002/may/eval_en.html).

Conclusion

As a final note, we would like to highlight the eminently political nature of the EES that appeared in the five-year evaluation of the strategy (see *JESP*, ‘Digest’ 13.2.1 and 13.3.1 for more details), as well as to the fact that no clear status was agreed in constitutional convention for the OMC (see de Búrca and Zeitlin, 2003 for more details). It appears, especially after having analysed the development of the EES and its recent repoliticization, that these questions need to be addressed directly and systematically. Politicization does not necessarily lead to a prioritization of the most efficient solutions, especially if these have resulted from negotiation among the 15 member governments of the EU. It could lead to selecting proposals that meet the lowest degree of resistance, but which are not necessarily the most efficient; or to prioritizing the solutions that are in line with the ideological majority. As Hemerijck and Visser underlined (2001: 9) ‘There is often a tension between a valid policy analysis, with its emphasis on precision and clear objectives, and a reliable policy analysis, with its emphasis on shared

understanding and consensus in the face of political opposition’. It goes without saying that European compromises render the possibility of attaining an effective policy analysis even more difficult.

Notes

- 1 Proposal submitted by the European University Institute (Florence) for the European Commission’s Framework Programme 6 Research Funding, Florence, 2003, page 1.
- 2 It is important to point out that the recommendation tool is not part of the OMC. It exists in the economic and employment coordination processes only.
- 3 This was organized around 10 themes, the results of which are posted on the website of the European Commission [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/news/2002/may/eval_en.html].

References

- Adnett, N. (2001) ‘Modernizing the European Social Model: Developing the Guidelines’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (2): 353–64.
- Barbier, J.-C. (2001) ‘Welfare to Work Policies in Europe – the Current Challenges of Activation Policies’, Document de Travail No. 11. Paris: Centre d’études de l’emploi.
- Begg, I. (2003) ‘Hard and Soft Economic Policy Coordination under EMU: Problems, Paradoxes and Prospects’, Working Paper Series No. 103, Center for European Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge. (http://www.ces.pas.haward.edu/working_papers/BeggHardEMU.pdf)
- Biagi, M. (2000) ‘The Impact of European Employment Strategy on the Role of Labour Law and Industrial Relations’, *The International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations* 16 (2): 155–73.
- Bisopoulos, A. (forthcoming) ‘The European Employment Strategy: Innovative Governance by Peer Review’, in K. Holzinger, C. Knill and D. Lehmkuhl (eds) *Conditions and Patterns of Governance in Historical Comparison*. Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
- Cohen, J. and Sabel, C. (2003) ‘Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US’, in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds) *Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments*, pp. 345–375. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- de Búrca, G. and Zeitlin, J. (2003) ‘Constitutionalizing the Open Method of Coordination – What Should the Convention Propose’, CEPS

- Policy Brief No. 31, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, March 2003.
- Dehousse, R. (forthcoming) *La Méthode ouverte de coordination: convergence et politiques dans l'UE*. Paris: L'Harmattan.
- de la Porte, C. (2002) 'Is the Open Method of Co-ordination Appropriate for Organising Activities at European level in Sensitive Policy Areas?', *European Law Journal* 8 (1): 38–58.
- de la Porte, C. and Pochet, P. (2002) *Building Social Europe through the Open Method of Co-ordination*. Brussels: P.I.E.–Peter Lang.
- de la Porte, C. and Pochet, P. (2003) 'A Twofold Assessment of Employment Policy Coordination in Light of Economic Policy Coordination', in D. Foden and L. Magnusson (eds) *Five Years' Experience of the Luxembourg Employment Strategy*, pp. 13–68. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute.
- de la Porte, C., Pochet, P. and Room, G. (2001) 'Social Benchmarking, Policy-making and the Instruments of New Governance', *Journal of European Social Policy* 11 (4): 291–307.
- Dyson, K. (1994) *Elusive Union: the Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe*. London and New York: Longman.
- Eberlein, B. and Kerwer, D. (2002) 'Theorising the New Modes of European Union Governance', *European Integration Online Papers (Eiop)* 6 (5) [<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002-005a.htm>].
- Ferrera, M. (2001) 'The European Social Model, Between the "Hard" Constraints and "Soft" Co-ordination', contribution to the Conference 'European Social Models: Convergence or Coexistence?' (Nov.), Brussels.
- Ferrera, M., Hemerijck, A. and Rhodes, M. (2000) 'The Future of the European Welfare State: Managing Diversity for a Prosperous and Cohesive Europe', Report for the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union. Lisbon.
- Ferrera, M., Matsaganis, M. and Sacchi, S. (2002) 'Open Co-ordination Against Poverty: the New EU "Social Inclusions Process"', *Journal of European Social Policy* 12 (3): 227–39.
- Foden, D. and Magnusson, L. (2000) *Contested Territory. Entrepreneurship in the European Employment Strategy*. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute and SALTSA.
- Goetschy, J. (1999) 'The European Employment Strategy: Genesis and Development', *European Journal of Industrial Relations* 5 (2): 117–37.
- Goetschy, J. (2003) 'The European Employment Strategy, Multi-level Governance and Policy Coordination: Past, Present and Future', in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds) *Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments*, pp. 59–87. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hartwig, I. (2002) 'The Luxembourg Process and the Structural Funds: Two Tracks of One Employment Strategy', in E. Best and D. Bossaert *From Luxembourg to Lisbon and Beyond, Making the Employment Strategy Work*, pp. 111–20. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- Hemerijck, A. (2001) 'The Self-transformation of the European Social Model(s)', paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of APSA (Aug.–Sep.), Boston.
- Hemerijck, A. and Visser, J. (2001) 'Learning and Mimicking: How European Welfare States Reform', June 2001, unpublished manuscript.
- Hodson, D. and Maher, I. (2001) 'The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39 (4): 719–45.
- Jacobsson, K. (2001a) 'Employment and Social Policy Co-ordination. A New System of EU Governance', paper for the Scancor Workshop on Transnational Regulation and the Transformation of States (Jun.), Stanford.
- Jacobsson, K. (2001b) 'Innovations in EU Governance: the Case of Employment Policy Co-ordination', SCORE Working Paper No. 2001: 12. Stockholm: Stockholm University [<http://www.score.su.se/pdfs/2001-12.pdf>].
- Jacobsson, K. (forthcoming) 'Trying to Reform the "Best Pupils in Class"? The OMC in Sweden and Denmark', in P. Pochet and J. Zeitlin (eds) *Opening the Open Method of Coordination: the Case of the European Employment Strategy*. Brussels: P.I.E. – Peter Lang.
- Jenson, J. and Pochet, P. (forthcoming) 'Employment and Social Policy Since Maastricht: Standing up to the European Monetary Union', in R. Fishman and A. Messima (eds) *The Year of the EURO*. Notre Dame: The University of Notre Dame Press.
- Joerges, C. (1999), "'Good Governance" Through Comitology?', in C. Joerges and E. Vos (eds) *1999 EU Committees: Social Regulation, Law and Politics*, pp. 311–38. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Joerges, C. and Neyer, J. (1997) 'From Inter-governmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: the Constitutionalisation of Comitology', *European Law Journal* 3 (3): 273–99.
- Knill, C. and Lenschow, A. (2003) 'Modes of Social Regulation in the Governance of Europe', discussion paper presented at the European University Institute (Mar.), Florence.
- Kooiman, J. (1993) 'Social-political Governance: Introduction', in J. Kooiman (ed.) *Modern Governance: New Government–Society Interactions*, pp. 1–9. London: Sage Publications.
- Marks, G., Nielsen, F., Ray, L. and Salk, J. (1996)

- 'Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union', in G. Marks, F. W. Scharpf, P. C. Schmitter and W. Streeck (eds) *Governance in the European Union*, pp. 40–64. London: Sage Publications.
- Meyer, C. O. (2003) 'Towards an Europeanization of Socio-economic Discourses? How the Co-ordination of Fiscal and Employment Policies is Reflected in the Quality Press of Large Member States', Paper prepared for the Govacor mid-term review workshop (Jan.), Brussels [http://www.govacor.org/data/20030107174134_Discourse_Midterm_Review_Meyer.pdf].
- Overdevest, C. (2002) 'The Open Method of Coordination, New Governance, and Learning: Towards a Research Agenda', New Governance Project Working Paper. University of Wisconsin-Madison [<http://www.wisc.edu/wage/papers/OMCtr2.pdf>].
- Pochet, P. (2002) 'Employment: the Last Year Before Change', in P. Pochet and C. Degryse, (eds) *Social Developments of the European Union 2001*, pp. 57–83. Brussels: European Trade Union Institute and Observatoire social Européen.
- Pochet, P. (2003) 'OMC: a Way to Improve Democratic Europe?', paper prepared for the 8th EUSA Conference (Mar.), Nashville, Tennessee.
- Raveaud, G. (2001) 'La dimension européenne des politiques d'emploi françaises. Une analyse de la participation des partenaires sociaux à l'élaboration du PNAE 2001', Rapport pour la Délégation Générale à l'Emploi et à la Formation Professionnelle (DGEFP), ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité, Paris November 2001.
- Rodrigues, M. J. (2002) *The New Knowledge Economy in Europe. A Strategy for International Competitiveness and Social Cohesion*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Rosamond, B. (2000) *Theories of European Integration, the European Union Series*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Rubery, J. (2002) 'Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Quality in the EU: the Impact of the EU Employment Strategy', *Industrial Relations Journal* 33 (5): 500–22.
- Scharpf, F. W. (2002) 'The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (4): 645–70.
- Schekle, W. (forthcoming) 'Understanding New Forms of European Integration: a Study in Competing Political Economy Explanations', in E. Jones and A. Verdun (eds) *Political Economy Approaches to the Study of European Integration*. London: Routledge.
- Schmid, H. (2002) 'Working Document on the Impact Evaluation and Future of the European Employment Strategy', European Parliament, Committee on Employment and Social Affairs, 28 June.
- Schmidt, V. A. (2000) 'Values and Discourse in the Politics of Adjustment', in Scharpf, F. W. and Schmidt, V. A. (eds) *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy, Volume I: From Vulnerability to Competitiveness*, pp. 229–309. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Szyszczak, E. (2000a) 'The Evolving European Employment Strategy', in J. Shaw (ed.) *Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union*, pp. 197–222. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
- Szyszczak, E. (2000b) *EC Labour Law*. Harlow: Longman.
- Telò, M. (2002) 'Governance and Government in the European Union: the Open Method of Coordination', in M. J. Rodrigues (ed.) *The New Knowledge Economy in Europe. A Strategy for International Competitiveness and Social Cohesion*, pp. 242–72. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Trubek, D. and Mosher, J. (2001) 'EU Governance, Employment Policy and the European Social Model', Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 6/01, New York University [<http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/011501.html>].
- Trubek, D. and Mosher, J. (2003) 'New Governance, Employment Policy and the European Social Model', in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds) *Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments*, pp. 33–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Riel, B. and van der Meer, M. (2002) 'The Advocacy Coalition for European Employment Policy, European Integration Process after EMU', in H. Hegmann and B. Neumaerker (eds) *Die Europäische Union aus politökonomischer Perspektive*, pp. 309–28. Marburg: Metropolis Verlag.
- Visser, J. (2002) 'Is the European Employment Strategy the Answer?', paper presented at the NIG Workshop 'Gouvernability in Post-industrial Societies: the European Experience' (Apr.), Utrecht School of Governance.
- Wessels, W. and Linsenmann, I. (2001) 'EMU's Impact on National Institutions: Fusion Towards a "Gouvernance économique" or Fragmentation?', in K. Dyson (ed.) *European States and the Euro: Europeanisation, Variation and Convergence*, pp. 53–77. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Winterton, J. and Foden, D. (2002) 'The Trade Unions, the Luxembourg Process in the Elaboration of the European Employment Strategy', paper presented at the UACES Workshop, Loughborough University, 26 April 2002.
- Zeitlin, J. (2002) 'Opening the Open Method of Coordination', presentation prepared for the Committee of the Regions Conference on 'The Open Method of Coordination: Improving European Governance?' (Sep.–Oct.), Brussels.